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To:  Administrator, Office of Federal Procurement Policy 
 
From:  Bruce Tsai  
 
Subject: Targeting Frivolous Bid Protests by Revisiting the Competition in Contracting 
Act’s Automatic Stay Provision 
 
I. Action Forcing Event 
 
 A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report earlier this year highlights that bid 
protests (hereafter known as “protests”) filed to the GAO have increased by over 71% from Fiscal 
Year (FY) 2004 to FY 2013.1 2 
II. Statement of Problem 
 
Conceptually, protests provide external oversight to Government procurements. Within 
the GAO, the Comptroller General has supported protests by stating the integrity of the award 
process outweighs any advantage the Government may receive from an improper award.3 
However, frivolous protests are a problem. While legitimate protests test the integrity of the 
award process, frivolous protests only test the litigious will of the Government and successful 
contractors.  
When contractors submit frivolous protests they are exploiting the protest mechanism to 
impede competition.4 Former Office of Procurement Policy (OFPP) Administrator Steven 
Kelman was a critic of this exploitation. He found that protests were time-consuming and 
                                                          
1 Government Accountability Office. Bid Protest Statistics for Fiscal Years 2009-2013 (GAO-14-276SP). 
January 2, 2014. 
2 Government Accountability Office. Bid Protest Statistics for Fiscal Years 2004-2008 (GAO-09-251R). 
December 22, 2008. 
3 Dembling, Paul. "The Commission Recommendations: The GAO as a Bid Protest Forum." George 
Washington Law Review 42, no. 2 (1974), 5. 
4 William Kovacic, Procurement Reform and the Choice of Forum in Bid Protest Disputes. (working paper., 
George Mason University School of Law, 1996), 489. 
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expensive, rendered agencies excessively risk-averse, and decreased goodwill and partnership.5 In 
other words, protests disrupt the Government-contractor relationship. 
In the modern era which Ronald Moe and Robert Gilmour label the Entrepreneurial 
Governing Approach,6 contractors are paramount to the execution of Government. As of 2006, 
Paul Light (New York University and The Brookings Institute) estimated 10.5 million federal 
contractors and grantees versus 1.9 million civil servants in the federal government.7 Protests 
have the potential to disrupt the work of all 10.5 million federal contractors and grantees. This 
disruption should at least come with the positive attributes of external oversight. A proper protest 
mechanism should protect the contractor’s interest to hold the Government accountable while 
respecting the agency’s interest to minimize disruption to the mission.8  
Data provided by the GAO supports the notion that there is an increase in frivolous 
protests. In the last decade, the number of protests increased substantially while the percentage of 
sustained protests9 decreased. If we trust the GAO as an impartial arbiter, a reduced sustain rate 






                                                          
5 Steven Schooner, Watching the Sunset: Anticipating GAO’s Study of Concurrent Bid Protest Jurisdiction in 
the COFC and the District Courts. (working paper no. 146, The George Washington University Law School, 
2000), 108. 
6 Lori Anderson, The Meaning of Inherently Governmental in OMB Circular A-76 from 1966 to 2003: A 
Change in Governing Approaches. (dissertation. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2008), 
9. 
7 Lee, Christopher. "Big Government Gets Bigger." Washington Post, October 6, 2006. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/05/AR2006100501782.html. 
8 Paul Benishek, and Benjamin Sheinman, Achieving Better Acquisition through ADR and other Best 
Practices for Resolving Bid Protests. (working paper., Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 6. 
9 A sustained bid protest is a bid protest that goes to hearing and ruled in favor of the aggrieved 
contractor 












Protests became disruptive when the Government came to rely on contractors to function. 
The potential for protests naturally increases as the amount of contract work increases. In 
response, the Government passed a series of legislation in the 1980s and 1990s to streamline 
protest adjudication. First, this section will explore how and why the Government came to rely on 
contractors. Next, this section will look at two major pieces of legislation during this time period 
that addressed the growing number of protests. The first piece of legislation is the Competition in 
Contracting Act of 1984 which formalized the GAO protest mechanism. The second piece of 
legislation is the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 which brought efficiency to 
Government procurements.  
                                                          
10 Government Accountability Office. Bid Protest Statistics for Fiscal Years 2009-2013 (GAO-14-276SP). 
January 2, 2014. 
11 Government Accountability Office. Bid Protest Statistics for Fiscal Years 2004-2008 (GAO-09-251R). 
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Government by Contract, “The Product of Design, not Bureaucratic Happenstance” 
 
In the second half of the 20th century, Moe and Gilmour describe a governance shift from  
Constitutional values such as: “democratic, political, and administrative”12 to economic values: Is 
the taxpayer getting their money’s worth of services from the Government? This new economic 
outlook provides the backdrop for the growth of contractors in the Government. When the 
Executive Branch’s priorities shift to cost and quality, the Executive Branch must turn to the 
private market to “improve services provided by a monopolistic bureaucracy.”13 Daniel Guttman 
calls this growth, “the product of design, not bureaucratic happenstance.” During the 1950s, the 
Government used the contractor workforce to respond to both an external threat (Soviet Union) 
and internal fear (Centralized Government) of the Cold War. The Government used the 
contractors’ military and scientific expertise to countervail the Soviet machine without growing 
the size of the US central Government.14 
 The modern growth in contractors would take off under Reagan. Reagan believed that the 
Executive branch was encumbered with bureaucracy and unable to efficiently serve the American 
people. Reagan was able to contract out services in tandem with his “ideas of slenderizing the 
bureaucracy and cutting federal personnel… The Reagan era set the base for what later became 
labeled the New Public Management philosophy, including the continuing attack on the public 
sector, the prevalence of ideas compatible with economic theory… as measures of Government 
success.”15 
Clinton continued the contracting trend under the auspice of a more efficient 
Government. On September 14, 1993, Clinton issued Executive Order 12862, “Setting Customer 
                                                          
12 Lori Anderson, The Meaning of Inherently Governmental in OMB Circular A-76 from 1966 to 2003: A 
Change in Governing Approaches. (dissertation. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2008), 
163 
13 Paul Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions. (working paper., Cardozo 
Law School, Yeshiva University, 2005), 3. 
14 Thomas Stanton, and Daniel Guttman, Meeting the Challenge of 9/11: Blueprints for More Effective 
Government, (M.E. Sharpe, 2006), chap. 10, 4. 
15 Larkin Dudley, Need for Balance? Publicness in the Inherently Governmental Dialogue. (working paper., 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2008), 8. 
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Service Standards,” which enjoined that “the Federal Government provides the highest quality 
service possible to the American people.”16 Shortly after, Clinton tasked Vice-President Gore 
with the National Performance Review (NPR) which studied the operations of America’s best 
businesses. NPR’s goal was to incorporate these operations into a businesslike Government.17 
Under businesslike Government, the contractor workforce became increasingly 
necessary. The easiest way to adopt businesslike Government is to put business in Government. 
As a result, Gore would lead reforms to streamline the purchase of supplies and services. In 1994 
and 1996 respectively, Congress passed the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act and the 
Clinger-Cohen Act which provided, “greater purchaser discretion” and “less… bureaucratic 
constraint” to the acquisition process.18  
George W. Bush took contracting even further when he revised the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 to allow direct competition between the Federal 
Government and private industry for work not deemed “inherently governmental.” As a result, 
George W. Bush directed a competition for half of the 850,000 positions identified.19 The 20th 
Century had completed its evolution to Government by contract. 
Formalizing the GAO Protest Mechanism: The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 
 
As the Government became reliant on contractors, protests turned from a nuisance to a 
threat to governance itself. In response, the Government formalized the GAO protest forum in the 
Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984. While protest forums exist in the Executive and 
Judicial branches, a 1972 Commission on Government Procurement found that a GAO hegemony 
exists by “(a) providing an independent and objective forum; (b) providing an administrative 
                                                          
16 Exec. Order No. 12862, 58 FR 48257 
17 Albert Gore, Businesslike Government: Lessons Learned from America's Best Companies, National 
Performance Review, (DIANE Publishing, 1997). 
18 Steven Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure of Businesslike Government. (working 
paper no. 022, The George Washington University Law School, 2001), 8-9. 
19 Valerie Grasso, Defense Outsourcing: The OMB Circular A-76 Policy. (working paper., Congressional 
Research Service, 2005), 14-16. 
 6  
 
forum…faster than either the courts or boards of contract appeals; (c) developing a 
comprehensive body of award protest law that applies to the government as a whole.”20 
Recent data shows that the GAO caseload is far heavier than the Court of Federal Claims’ 
(COFC) caseload.21 In addition, a GAO Study in 2000 found that the COFC caseload is far 
heavier than the District Courts’ caseload.22 
Caseload 
 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
GAO (Fiscal 






88 74 79 81 64 68 
District Court  No Centralized Repository, but fewer than Court of Federal Claims 




No Centralized Repository 
 
Therefore, any attempt to address the volume of protests has to occur in the GAO forum. The 
goal of CICA was to create a GAO forum that enables legitimate protests, streamlines legitimate 
protests, and discourages frivolous protests. 
  
                                                          
20 Dembling, Paul. "The Commission Recommendations: The GAO as a Bid Protest Forum." George 
Washington Law Review 42, no. 2 (1974), 284. 
21 Daniel Forman, Peter Eyre, and Puja Satiani, Bid Protests: Trends and Developments. (lecture, Ounce of 
Prevention Seminar (OOPS), 2011) 
22 General Accounting Office, Rep No. GAO/GGD/OGC-00-72, Bid Protests: Characteristics of Cases Filed in 
Federal Courts (2000) 
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Enabling Legitimate Protests through Independence and Objectivity 
CICA enables legitimate protests by preserving a GAO already rooted in independence 
and objectivity. The genesis of GAO’s independence and objectivity is found with its navigation 
of Supreme Court decisions Buckley v. Valeo and Immigration and Naturalization Service v. 
Chahda. Under Buckley, the Supreme Court found that Congress could not retain power to 
appoint members of an administrative agency (i.e. Federal Election Committee). Under Chahda, 
the Supreme Court found that Congress’ attempt to over-ride the Attorney General’s suspension 
of a deportation was a “trial by legislature” without adequate due process and a “legislative veto” 
violating the Constitution’s Presentment Clause.23 24 
When Reagan signed CICA, he expressed reservations over the Comptroller General 
over-stepping separation of powers. However, CICA addresses this concern by maintaining a 
GAO structure that functions and performs more like an independent agency and less like a 
legislative agency. The Supreme Court has found that the status of an agency can be determined 
by the function it performs25 rather than its physical address. The GAO maintains this 
independent structure in compliance with both Buckley and Chahda. To comply with Buckley, the 
Comptroller General is appointed for fifteen years in accordance with the Appointments Clause 
and requires a joint resolution26 to remove.27 To comply with Chahda, GAO decisions are 
recommendations which lack an official bite. As such, GAO decisions provide the oversight of an 
independent agency without a “trial by legislature” or “legislative veto.” The consequence of an 
agency disregarding a GAO decision is a report to Congress. 
                                                          
23 Weitzel, Jr., James. "GAO Bid Protest Procedures under the Competition in Contracting Act: 
Constitutional Implications after Buckley and Chadha." Catholic University Law Review 34 (1985), 507. 
24 Presentment Clause (US Constitution, Article I, Section 7, Clauses 2 and 3), “Every Bill shall have passed 
the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall before it become a Law, be presented to the President 
of the United States.” 
25 Weitzel, Jr., James. "GAO Bid Protest Procedures under the Competition in Contracting Act: 
Constitutional Implications after Buckley and Chadha." Catholic University Law Review 34 (1985), 519. 
26 Joint resolution requires a Presidential signature or an override by a Congressional super-majority 
27 Weitzel, Jr., James. "GAO Bid Protest Procedures under the Competition in Contracting Act: 
Constitutional Implications after Buckley and Chadha." Catholic University Law Review 34 (1985), 520. 
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Enabling Legitimate Protests through Expertise 
The GAO forum enables legitimate protests through its comprehensive body of protest 
law gained from a high volume of cases.28 In comparison, Steven Schooner (former Associate 
Administrator for Law & Legislation in the OFPP) suggests that the COFC has such a “hodge-
podge” jurisdiction that it cannot be a master of procurement law.29 This level of competence 
bodes even worse for the lesser-utilized protest forums. 
Enabling Protests through Meaningful Relief 
CICA gives GAO a generous selection of remedies that encourage both legitimate and 
frivolous protests. The GAO’s remedies include: cancelling or reissuing a solicitation, 
terminating an award, changing restrictive specifications,30 curing defects in the evaluation,31 and 
granting bid and proposal costs as well as attorney’s fees.32 Even though a remedy is only 
realized if the protest is sustained, the wide-selection of remedies combined with the low cost to 
protest33 encourages any unsuccessful offeror34 to try. 
Enabling Protests through Automatic Stay Provision 
Prior to CICA, agencies would commence performance during a protest to erode any 
meaningful relief for the unsuccessful offeror.35 Therefore, CICA institutes an automatic stay of 
performance unless an agency determines that there is an “urgent and compelling” circumstance 
                                                          
28 William Kovacic, Procurement Reform and the Choice of Forum in Bid Protest Disputes. (working paper., 
George Mason University School of Law, 1996), 484. 
29 Robert Metzger, and Daniel Lyons, A Critical Reassessment of the GAO Bid-Protest Mechanism. (working 
paper., Georgetown University Law Center, 1977), 1235 
30John Tieder, Jr. and John Tracy. "Forums and Remedies for Disappointed Bidders on Federal Government 
Contracts." Public Contract Law Journal 10 (1978), 103. 
31 Weitzel, Jr., James. "GAO Bid Protest Procedures under the Competition in Contracting Act: 
Constitutional Implications after Buckley and Chadha." Catholic University Law Review 34 (1985), 498. 
32 William Kovacic, Procurement Reform and the Choice of Forum in Bid Protest Disputes. (working paper., 
George Mason University School of Law, 1996), 468. 
33 Robert Metzger, and Daniel Lyons, A Critical Reassessment of the GAO Bid-Protest Mechanism. (working 
paper., Georgetown University Law Center, 1977), 1237. 
34 Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 2.101 states, ““offeror “ means offeror or bidder.” 
35 Cho, Young. "Judicial Review of "The Best Interest of the United States" Justification for CICA Overrides: 
Overstepping Boundaries or Giving the Bite Back?" Public Contract Law Journal34, no. 2 (2005), 340. 
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to proceed with the contract.36 The purpose of the automatic stay is to preserve all options for 
relief during protest adjudication. However, there is a concern that the cost of the automatic stay 
could outweigh the benefits,37 especially in cases where the incumbent contractor has lost a re-
competition. An incumbent can use the automatic stay to prolong their current contract whether 
the protest has merit or not. 
Streamlining Legitimate Protests 
 GAO’s non-binding decisions allow it to meet CICA’s 100 day rule for adjudication. This 
100 day rule not only minimizes disruption to the Government, but also saves the unsuccessful 
offeror costs from drawn-out litigation. The 100 day rule is very rigid with its deadlines for both 
the unsuccessful offeror and the Government; a missed deadline often renders a case 
inadmissible. These deadlines extend beyond the GAO: Agency-level protests are bound by 
CICA’s rules for timeliness unless the agency has stricter rules.38 The 100 day rule can be waived 
when the need for oversight trumps efficiency as defined by cases which “present(s) novel or 
significant issues of interest to the procurement community.”39  
Streamlining Protests and the loss of Discovery and De Novo Review 
The drawback to efficiency is that GAO operates without many safeguards of the courts40 
such as full discovery41 and de novo review.42 The 100 day rule does not provide time for full 
discovery. Discovery usually comes down to the limited documents that can be produced during 
                                                          
36 Robert Metzger, and Daniel Lyons, A Critical Reassessment of the GAO Bid-Protest Mechanism. (working 
paper., Georgetown University Law Center, 1977), 1231. 
37 Ibid 1240 
38 Kim, Eugene. "Late Is Late: The GAO Bid Protest Timeliness Rules, and How They Can Be a Model for 
Boards of Contract Appeals." Army Law 30 (2007), 35 
39 Ibid 36 
40 Robert Metzger, and Daniel Lyons, A Critical Reassessment of the GAO Bid-Protest Mechanism. (working 
paper., Georgetown University Law Center, 1977), 1227. 
41 Kim, Eugene. "Late Is Late: The GAO Bid Protest Timeliness Rules, and How They Can Be a Model for 
Boards of Contract Appeals." Army Law 30 (2007), 37. 
42 Jonathan Cantor, Bid Protests and Procurement Reform: The Case for Leaving Well Enough Alone. 
(working paper., The George Washington University School of Law, 1998), 177. 
 10  
 
CICA’s short deadlines. If a document dispute exists, “GAO will resolve the matter,”43 which 
entails making a quick judgment call. In 1990, the GAO proposed amending CICA to provide full 
discovery44, but this was never adopted to protect efficiency.45 The 100 day rule also does not 
allow for De Novo review. The GAO defaults towards the agency’s judgment when ruling in each 
case. De Novo review would force the GAO to hear the case objectively without deference to the 
agency’s judgment.46 This expanded standard of review47 compromises efficiency. There has 
never been an attempt to add de novo review to the GAO forum. The Administrative Dispute 
Resolution Act of 1996 which amended the Tucker Act attempts to address the lack of safeguards 
by allowing protesters seeking the full judicial experience (i.e. full discovery and de novo review) 
to re-file with the COFC.48 
Discouraging Frivolous Protests 
CICA has two mechanisms to reduce the number of ostensibly frivolous protests: the 
prejudice standard and definition of an interested party. Regarding the prejudice standard, an 
unsuccessful offeror must “demonstrate a reasonable possibility that it was prejudiced…” In other 
words, “But for the agency’s actions… (the unsuccessful offeror) would have had a substantial 
chance of receiving award.”49 In this case, the GAO is only interested in violations that affect the 
outcome of a procurement. GAO provides no remediation for all other violations. 
CICA officially defines an interested party as “an actual or prospective bidder or offeror 
whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by failure to 
                                                          
43 Kim, Eugene. "Late Is Late: The GAO Bid Protest Timeliness Rules, and How They Can Be a Model for 
Boards of Contract Appeals." Army Law 30 (2007), 37 
44 McAvoy, Roger. "Bid Protest - Balancing Public and Private Interests." The Air Force Law Review 34 
(1991), 229 
45 John Tieder, Jr. and John Tracy. "Forums and Remedies for Disappointed Bidders on Federal 
Government Contracts." Public Contract Law Journal 10 (1978), 102. 
46 Jonathan Cantor, Bid Protests and Procurement Reform: The Case for Leaving Well Enough Alone. 
(working paper., The George Washington University School of Law, 1998), 167: De Novo defined in the 
context of the General Services Board of Contract Appeals (GSBCA). 
47 Ibid 168 
48 Frederick Claybrook, Jr. Standing, Prejudice, and Prejudging in Bid Protest Cases. (working paper., 
Crowell & Moring, LLP., 2004), 535. 
49 Ibid 547. 
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award the contract.”50 This means an “interested party” is defined as whoever was next in line for 
contract award, unless the protestor is challenging a solicitation.51 In this case, the GAO is only 
interested in overseeing violations that affect a narrowly-defined complainant. Others who might 
be affected (e.g. subcontractors) are not considered interested parties and not worthy of 
remediation. 
Streamlining Federal Procurements: The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 and 
Progeny 
 
Despite CICA’s modest effort to curtail frivolous protests, CICA may have created a 
GAO protest forum that was too efficient with too few barriers to entry. In the decade after CICA, 
the number of GAO protests grew annually until it reached around 3,300 in FY1993.52 The 
Executive Branch would strike back under Vice President Gore’s NPR initiative. The OFPP 
administrator at the time, Steven Kelman, began a campaign to streamline federal procurements 
which culminated in the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 and progeny (e.g. 
Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996). FASA affected the number of protests by codifying wider discretion 
for Government personnel which led to fewer areas of challenge53 and building trust through 
increased dialogue between the Government and contractors. Under the rubric of FASA, the 
Government even visited the idea of sanctioning frivolous protests. 
  
                                                          
50 Ibid 537 
51 Alexander Brittin, The Comptroller General's Dual Statutory Authority to Decide Bid Protests. (working 
paper., McKenna & Cuneo, 1993), 640-641. 
52 Steven Schooner, Watching the Sunset: Anticipating GAO’s Study of Concurrent Bid Protest Jurisdiction 
in the COFC and the District Courts. (working paper no. 146, The George Washington University Law 
School, 2000), 108. 
53 Steven Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure of Businesslike Government. (working 
paper no. 022, The George Washington University Law School, 2001), 36. 
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Wider Discretion for Government Personnel 
When protests increase, federal agencies protect themselves with policies and training to 
build “protest-proof” contract files54 FASA supported this defensive strategy through 
procurement reforms that reduced external oversight (i.e. protests) through greater purchaser 
discretion.55 Kelman detested protests as an impediment to efficiency.56 Therefore, it is 
reasonable to expect that these reforms sought to reduce or were out rightly hostile towards 
protests. These reforms introduced and re-defined a new class of acquisitions including:  
1.  Micro-Purchase procurements ($3,000 or less) – the contracting official can award a 
procurement without competition.  
2. Simplified Acquisitions from ($3,000 to $30,000) – the contracting official can award a 
procurement by calling three vendors. 
3. Simplified Acquisitions from ($30,000 to $150,000) – the contracting official uses his/her 
best judgment to make a best value determination. 
4. Commercial Acquisition – the contracting official can use the simplified acquisition 
process to order a commercial item. The definition for commercial items is very broad. 
Once an item is determined commercial, the Government can describe how it intends to 
use the product rather than generating formal specifications.57 
5. IDIQ Contracts – the contracting official can issue an IDIQ contract to a pool of vendors. 
An IDIQ contract allows the Government to compete work issued through task/delivery 
orders among the pool of IDIQ vendors. Ultimately, the contracting official is the 
authority of which companies receive the task/delivery orders. 
                                                          
54 Erik Troff, Agency-Level Bid Protest Reform: Time For a Little Less Efficiency?. (The Department of Air 
Force through the George Washington University, 2005), 4. 
55 Steven Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure of Businesslike Government. (working 
paper no. 022, The George Washington University Law School, 2001), 2,3,8, and 9. 
56 Ibid 45 
57 Linda Lebowitz. Bid Protest Issues Arising in Commercial Item Acquisitions. working paper., United 
States General Accounting Office, 1998, 430-431, 440. 
 13  
 
This new class of acquisitions affords the contracting official greater latitude and 
authority in procurement decisions thereby replacing layers of bureaucracy with employee 
empowerment. The result was “the Clinton Administration…would give public purchasing 
officials more discretion and increase their ability to defeat challenges by disappointed 
offerors."58 By replacing regulation with discretion, the new class of acquisitions eliminates 
avenues for protests. 
Discretion comes down to the best judgment of the contracting official. Compounding 
this arbitrary metric, the best judgment of the contracting official can be called into question 
based on the decimation of the Government’s Acquisition workforce in the 1990s. From 1989 to 
2001, the acquisition workforce in the Government has shrunk substantially; the Department of 
Defense reported a reduction of approximately 55%.59 An increase in empowerment concurrent 
with a reduction in acquisition workforce equates to fewer protests when oversight may be 
needed the most. 
Increased Dialogue 
The second strategy FASA employed to reduce protests was increased dialogue. The 
Government’s lack of disclosure had caused a high level of distrust in the contractor community. 
When a contractor loses a competitive procurement and the Government provides insufficient 
rationale, the contractor is more likely to file a protest.60 FASA addresses this concern by 
increasing debriefing requirements. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 15.1006(d) requires 
that the Government “disclose much more information not only on how the Government 
                                                          
58 William Kovacic, Procurement Reform and the Choice of Forum in Bid Protest Disputes. (working paper., 
George Mason University School of Law, 1996), 464. 
59 Steven Schooner, Watching the Sunset: Anticipating GAO’s Study of Concurrent Bid Protest Jurisdiction 
in the COFC and the District Courts. (working paper no. 146, The George Washington University Law 
School, 2000), 3. 
60 David Thomas, An Examination of the Effects of The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 on the 
Post-Award Debriefing Process and Bid Protest Frequency. (master\., Air Force Institute of Technology, 
1997), 7. 
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evaluators viewed proposals, but also on the evaluation process itself.”61 The increase in 
disclosure aimed to fix the trust issue and avoid unnecessary protests. 
Proposal to Sanction Frivolous Protests 
 During the FASA time-period, a blue ribbon commission known as the Acquisition Law 
Advisory Panel (“Section 800 Committee”) recommended stronger sanctions to frivolous 
protests.62 In response, President Clinton endorsed sanctions, which included reimbursing the 
Government’s costs for defending the protest, in the Federal Acquisition Improvement Act of 
1995.63 Ultimately, this bill died and was the last time the Government seriously considered 
sanctions. 
A Reduction of Protests in the 1990s 
 In the 1990s, the Government experienced a drop in GAO protests which ultimately 
reached 1,146 cases in 2001. Steven Schooner, Kelman’s former colleague and occasional critic, 
ascribed the drop in protests to FASA and other streamlining efforts. Schooner extols the protest 
as a form of external oversight, “in this context, litigation as a form of external monitoring 
initiated by private attorneys… is a public good.”64 Consequently, he found the drop in protests 
troubling. However, Schooner may have placed too much blame on FASA because this 
downward trend would not continue. 
  
                                                          
61 Rand Allen, FASA, FARA, & ITMRA. Course Manual. (manuscript., Acquisition Streamlining Institute, 
1997), 15. 
62 William Kovacic, Procurement Reform and the Choice of Forum in Bid Protest Disputes. (working paper., 
George Mason University School of Law, 1996), 492. 
63 H.R.1388 – Federal Acquisition Improvement Act of 1995 
64 Steven Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure of Businesslike Government. (working 
paper no. 022, The George Washington University Law School, 2001), 3. 




Facts and Data 
 
The lull in protests came to an end around FY2008. In the last 10 years (FY2004 to 
FY2013), GAO protests grew from approximately 1,400 to 2,400, a 71% increase. 





The Government’s response to the increase in protests was minimal, an overt backlash to the 
streamlining efforts of the past two decades.  
Political/Policy Actors 
  
President Obama Appoints OFPP Administrator Daniel Gordon 
 The locus of procurement policy resides at the OFPP within the OMB. The OFPP 
underwent a major ideology change with the Obama administration. The Clinton and George W. 
Bush administrations prioritized efficiency and appointed OFPP administrators that led 
acquisition streamlining initiatives which culminated in FASA and OMB A-76 reforms (i.e. 
public-private competitions) respectively. The Obama administration swung the pendulum to the 
opposite end of the spectrum by appointing Dan Gordon as OFPP administrator in 2009. 
                                                          
65 Government Accountability Office. Bid Protest Statistics for Fiscal Years 2009-2013 (GAO-14-276SP). 
January 2, 2014. 
66Government Accountability Office. Bid Protest Statistics for Fiscal Years 2004-2008 (GAO-09-251R). 
December 22, 2008. 
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Gordon’s ideology placed a greater emphasis on oversight even if the cost was a lot less 
efficiency. This meant valuing protests regardless of their disruption to governance. 
After leaving office in 2011, Dan Gordon defends his ideology in a paper titled, “Bid 
Protests: The Costs are Real, but the Benefits Outweigh Them.” Dan Gordon’s paper is structured 
as follows: 1. A critique of his predecessors (e.g. Steven Kelman) who claimed that protests are 
expensive and disruptive; 2. Protests are not as common as we are led to believe; 3. Protest costs 
associated with litigation and disruption are not fully experienced; and 4. Protest benefits far 
outweigh costs in both the monetary (e.g. increased competition) and non-monetary (e.g. 
accountability, equity, transparency, etc…) sense.67 
To protect his ideology, Gordon’s positions often resort to selective data and subjective 
measures. For example, when trivializing the impact of protests, Gordon states that in “FY 
2006… there were approximately 1.92 protests for each billion (dollars) while in FY 2011, there 
were 2.74 protests per billion (dollars).”68 It is not an accurate characterization to compare 
quantity of protests to total procurement dollars. A more meaningful assessment would compare 
protested procurement dollars to total procurement dollars.  
The impact of protests is not just about overall quantity, but also the size of the 
procurements. If one of those protests was the $35B Air Force tanker protest in 200869 or the 
$6.8B NASA “Space Taxi” protest in 201470, the impact from a single protest is significant. 
Gordon even concedes that, “very high-dollar procurements are much more likely to be 
protested,” but offers the consolation “that does not change the overall picture, however, that bid 
                                                          
67 Gordon, Daniel. "Bid Protests: The Costs Are Real, But the Benefits Outweigh Them." Public Contract 
Law Journal 42, no. 3 (2013). 
68 Ibid 19 
69 "Boeing Wins $35B Air Force Tanker Contract." AP Online, February 25, 2011. Accessed October 16, 
2014. http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1A1-e8543584e1ea4bc68e8ddc7f20bb2468.html? 
70 Pasztor, Andy. "Sierra Nevada Steps up Legal Battle Over NASA 'Space Taxi' Competition."Wall Street 
Journal, October 16, 2014. Accessed October 16, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/sierra-nevada-
steps-up-legal-battle-over-nasa-space-taxi-competition-1413420919. 
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protests are rare.71” But it does change the overall picture. One rare protest valued at $35B is 
equivalent to 233,333 protests valued at $150,000 (this value is chosen because it is the maximum 
threshold for a simplified acquisition purchase order, therefore the smallest likely contract).72 
While Gordon does not cite the disruption of the tanker contract on the cost side of his 
ledger, he does account for it under the benefits side as an increase to public trust in the fair 
disbursement of taxpayer dollars.73 Where numbers are not convenient, Gordon supports his 
argument by citing the “author’s experience,” which he refers to 5 times verbatim as well as other 
“just trust me” allusions. While Gordon has impressive credentials both at the GAO and OFPP, 
the numerous arguments supported by the “author’s experience” and its derivatives do not 
engender much confidence in objectivity. Driven by a parochial need for oversight, Gordon may 
have missed the opportunity to grow oversight while preserving some efficiency.  
Congress 
Based on GAO’s annual report, Congress was well aware that protests increased by 
around 71% over the last ten years.74 However, Congress mostly follows OFPP’s lead when it 
comes to procurement policy, which at that time prioritized the protest oversight function. 
Consequently, Congress required GAO to begin reporting common agency improprieties in 
sustained protests and expanded the reach of protests to cover IDIQ task orders exceeding $10M. 
Congress did institute a protest filing fee, but it was clear that the intent of this fee was 
administrative only without a deterrence objective. 
  
                                                          
71 Gordon, Daniel. "Bid Protests: The Costs Are Real, But the Benefits Outweigh Them." Public Contract 
Law Journal 42, no. 3 (2013), 18. 
72 FAR Part 13.003(b)(1) 
73 Gordon, Daniel. "Bid Protests: The Costs Are Real, But the Benefits Outweigh Them." Public Contract 
Law Journal 42, no. 3 (2013), 42. 
74 See notes 67 and 68 
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1. Reporting Agency Improprieties 
Congress required GAO, in FY2013, to report the “most prevalent grounds for sustaining 
protests” in which the GAO found: “(1) failure to follow the solicitation evaluation criteria; (2) 
inadequate documentation of the record, (3) unequal treatment of offerors; and (4) unreasonable 
price or cost evaluation.”75 This exercise indicates that Congress intends to address the growth of 
protests by correcting agency improprieties. The shortcoming to this approach is that protests 
have increased as sustain rates have fallen.76 In other words, the quality of protests is declining, 
not the quality of agency processes.  
2. Expanding Protest Authority to IDIQ task orders exceeding $10M 
In 1994, FASA created an environment where IDIQ task orders and delivery orders77 can 
only be protested if “the order increases the scope, period or maximum value of the contract 
under which the order is issued.”78 Since IDIQ orders rarely meet the aforementioned criteria, 
these orders were exempt from protests. As IDIQ contracts grew in popularity, Congress began 
considering protests for certain IDIQ orders.  
 In the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of FY 2008, Congress granted 
authority to protest IDIQ orders in excess of $10M effective for 3 years beginning 120 days after 
the passage of the NDAA.79 Despite some deliberations and ambiguity in the 2011 time-period, 
Congress extended the authority through September 30, 2016 with the NDAA of FY 2012.80 The 
Government does not have a good count of how many procurement actions this affects since 
agencies often fail to report IDIQ orders to federal tracking systems, such as the Federal 
                                                          
75 Government Accountability Office. Bid Protest Statistics for Fiscal Years 2009-2013 (GAO-14-276SP). 
January 2, 2014. 
76 See notes 10 and 11 
77According to FAR 2.101, ““Task order” means an order for services placed against an established 
contract or with Government sources” and ““Delivery order” means an order for supplies placed against 
an established contract or with Government sources.” 
78 41 U.S.C. § 253j(e) (1994).  
79 H.R. 1585 National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008, Section 843(e) resulting in 41 U.S.C. § 253j(e) 
(2008) 
80 H.R. 1540 National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2012, Section 813(e) resulting in 41 U.S.C. § 253j(e) 
(2012) 
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Procurement Data System – Next Generation (FPDS-NG). However, the number is not 
insignificant. 
 The purpose of this legislation is to ensure that agencies maintain a level of fairness and 
thoroughness in awarding IDIQ orders over $10M. However, this puts the agency under scrutiny 
from potential protests twice, once when awarding an IDIQ contract and another time when 
awarding a task order or delivery order against that contract. The unintended consequence is two 
opportunities to interrupt an agency’s mission rather than just one. Furthermore, this legislation 
did not provide any additional criteria in assessing the merits of an IDIQ order protest. 
3. Instituting Modest Filing Fee 
In the 2014 Appropriations Act, Congress permitted GAO to charge a filing fee for 
protests.81 However, Congress limited this fee to sustaining the GAO’s bid protest filing system. 
GAO has floated around a fee amount of $240 which is clearly for administration and not 
deterrence.82 If this fee existed in FY2013, this fee would have offset $582,960 ($240 * 2,429 
cases) in costs to the Government. 
Affected Party – Industry 
 Industry will submit a protest whenever the benefits outweigh costs. Industry has 
indicated the following benefits to protest: gain relief, send message to agency even if they are 
not likely to win, obtain information for future bids, obtain competitive intelligence, hurt the 
winner by delaying award, retain revenue stream from a current contract if they are an incumbent 
that lost a re-compete, and demonstrate to corporate management that they are trying their best to 
win work.83 On the cost side, protests erode good-will with Government officials and provoke 
retaliation from competitors. The increase in frivolous protests indicates benefits currently exceed 
costs to litigation. If the Government does not consider decreasing benefits or adding costs 
                                                          
81 H.R. 3547 Sec. 1501 Section 3555 of title 31, United States Code (c)(2) 
82 Hornyak, Joseph. "Congress Authorizes GAO to Charge Bid Protest Filing Fees." Holland & Knight 
Government Contracts Blog. January 27, 2014 
83 Maser, Steven, Vladimir Subbotin, and Fred Thompson. "The GAO's Bid-Protest Mechanism: 
Effectiveness and Fairness in Defense Acquisitions?" 2010, 6-7. 
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(monetary and/or non-monetary) to protest, frivolous protests will continue as a weapon in 
corporate warfare. 
Affected Party – Agencies 
In the post-FASA environment, federal agencies are equipped to prioritize streamlining 
initiatives over public trust.84 Therefore business-oriented values such as: cost, schedule, and 
technical performance trump public trust values such as: equity, transparency, and oversight. In 
this context, the goal of federal agencies remains to minimize the number of protests filed and 
defeat existing protests as quickly as possible. Agencies work to stymy all protests, not just 
frivolous protests. It appears as though they are not given the regulatory tools or the incentive to 
discriminate between the two. 




 In general, the Government can reduce the number of protests and/or the disruption per 
protest in three ways: 1. Improve agency procurement processes; 2. Increase barriers to protest; 
and 3. Decrease incentives to protest. The recent efforts at the OMB and Congress seek to reduce 
protests by improving agency procurement processes. This entails targeting agency improprieties 
as the source of protests. In fact, Congress has even decreased barriers to protest such as 
expanding protest jurisdiction to IDIQ task orders exceeding $10M. Targeting agency 
improprieties has its limitations because it can only reduce legitimate protests. The decrease in 
protest sustain rates over the past decade suggests an increase in frivolous protests. The 
Government needs to address these frivolous protests by either erecting barriers or decreasing 
incentives. 
                                                          
84 Steven Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure of Businesslike Government. (working 
paper no. 022, The George Washington University Law School, 2001), 81-89. 
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 The undersigned proposes to remove an incentive to frivolously protest by eliminating 
the automatic stay on large contracts. In the post-award context, if an unsuccessful offeror files a 
protest within 10 days of contract award or 5 days after a de-briefing date, there is an automatic 
stay of performance on the contested contract. The head of an agency may override the automatic 
stay by justifying that performance of the contract is in the best interest of the Government or 
required under an urgent and compelling circumstance.85 If there is no override, the automatic 
stay concludes if/when the GAO dismisses the protest. Under current law, a protest disrupts the 
agency by default unless the agency takes action. This proposal will allow an agency to decide 
whether the merits of a protest warrant an immediate disruption. 
Since it is important to protect relief for small contracts, this proposal only removes the 
automatic stay for large contracts as defined by the Department of Defense’s (DOD) acquisition 
plan criteria: $10M for development (as defined by FAR 35.001) or $50M for production or 
services.86 The DOD has determined that acquisition plans are required on procurements large 
enough to warrant the attention of senior leadership. Therefore the acquisition plan criteria serve 
as a good dividing line between small and large contracts. The undersigned defines the criteria 
further by including contract options in the value of the procurement. 
  
                                                          
85 31 U.S.C. § 3553(d)(3) and 31 U.S.C. § 3553(d)(4) 
86 Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) Section 207.103 
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Policy Authorizing Tool 
 
 The policy authorizing tool will require a legislative change to CICA’s automatic stay 
provision codified in 31 U.S.C. § 3553(d). The change highlighted in red below will limit the 
automatic stay to protests below $10M for development or $50M for production and services. 
The stay will become an agency prerogative for protests exceeding this threshold. 
31 U.S.C. § 3553(d) with Proposed Change 
(3)(A) If the Federal agency awarding the contract receives notice of a protest in 
accordance with this section during the period described in paragraph (4) and the 
procurement does not exceed $10M for development or $50M for production or services, 
inclusive of contract options. “Development,” as used in this part, means the systematic 
use of scientific and technical knowledge in the design, development, testing, or 
evaluation of a potential new product or service (or of an improvement in an existing 
product or service) to meet specific performance requirements or objectives. It includes 
the functions of design engineering, prototyping, and engineering testing; it excludes 
subcontracted technical effort that is for the sole purpose of developing an additional 
source for an existing product.— 
(i) the contracting officer may not authorize performance of the contract to begin while 
the protest is pending; or 
(ii) if authorization for contract performance to proceed was not withheld in accordance 
with paragraph (2) before receipt of the notice, the contracting officer shall immediately 
direct the contractor to cease performance under the contract and to suspend any related 
activities that may result in additional obligations being incurred by the United States 
under that contract. 
(B) Performance and related activities suspended pursuant to subparagraph (A)(ii) by 
reason of a protest may not be resumed while the protest is pending. 
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(C) The head of the procuring activity may authorize the performance of the contract 
(notwithstanding a protest of which the Federal agency has notice under this section)— 
(i) upon a written finding that— 
(I) performance of the contract is in the best interests of the United States; or 
(II) urgent and compelling circumstances that significantly affect interests of the United 
States will not permit waiting for the decision of the Comptroller General concerning the 
protest; and 
(ii) after the Comptroller General is notified of that finding. 
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Agency Decision (Advantage) 
 This proposal removes the automatic stay for large contracts thereby allowing an agency 
to make the stay determination. The remaining CICA language allows an agency to decide 
whether to stay a contract based on whether “a protest is likely to be filed” and “the immediate 
performance of the contract is not in the best interest of the United States.”87 In other words, an 
agency can voluntarily stay contract performance if it believes that a protest has legitimate 
grounds and is likely to be sustained. This proposal allows an agency to balance cost and 
schedule risk of proceeding against the merits of a protest rather than disrupt work by default. 
Targets Frivolous Protests (Advantage) 
 This proposal targets frivolous protests only. Historically, the GAO dismisses two-thirds 
of the protests on its docket.88 Among these dismissed protests, there are contractors who believe 
that their case has merit, and those that intend to impede competition only. By removing the 
automatic stay, there is no avenue to stop performance without merit. Legitimate protests will 
continue to disrupt performance when the agency chooses to voluntarily stay performance or the 
protest prevails. If an unsuccessful offeror disagrees with an agency’s choice to continue 
performance during a protest, it can protest to the COFC and seek a preliminary injunction. 
However, a preliminary injunction requires that an unsuccessful offeror demonstrate: likelihood 
of success, irreparable harm, a balance of hardships, or public interest.89  
  
  
                                                          
87 31 U.S.C. § 3553(d)(2) 
88 Robert Metzger, and Daniel Lyons, A Critical Reassessment of the GAO Bid-Protest Mechanism. (working 
paper., Georgetown University Law Center, 1977), 1237. 
89 Ibid 1239. 
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Frivolous protests include incumbent contractors who have lost and are seeking to stay a 
follow-on contract in order to force an agency to extend the legacy contract until protest 
resolution. Bloomberg conducted a study that shows the incumbent win-rate for procurements 
over $100 million as: 
90 
Each incumbent loss is a potential protest. This policy will remove the incentive for incumbents 
to protest if their only goal is to stay the follow-on contract. 
Loss of Legitimate Protests (Disadvantage) 
 This proposal may run the risk of discouraging legitimate protests. Agency personnel 
have always supported disincentives to frivolously protest. However, it is tricky to craft 
legislation that discourages frivolous protests without also discouraging legitimate protests. If 
legislation is too draconian, it may discourage participation in Government contracting altogether 
thereby decreasing competition.91  
Schooner cites the False Claims Act as an example of a disincentive gone too far. 
Schooner believes that the False Claims Act drove contractors to “abandon… or settle claims 
rather than risk the audit, examination, and scrutiny associated with litigating those claims.” 
According to Schooner, the False Claims Act allows a simple dispute between the Government 
and contractor to expose the contractor to criminal charges from a misstatement, 
misrepresentation, etc… Although Schooner concedes that his assertion is largely anecdotal and 
                                                          
90 Bloomberg Government. "2013 Annual Review of Government Contracting." Government Executive, 
June 19, 2014, 14. 
91 Paul Benishek, and Benjamin Sheinman, Achieving Better Acquisition through ADR and other Best 
Practices for Resolving Bid Protests. (working paper., Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 67. 
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has “limited empirical evidence.”92 Gordon agrees that sanctions would limit competition and 
even adds that sanctions would require the GAO to add new layer of litigation to determine 
frivolity.93  
This proposal may very well discourage some legitimate protests. However this proposal 
is the removal of an incentive rather than the addition of a penalty and cannot be viewed as harsh 
as the False Claims Act. Furthermore, this proposal will not require a new layer of litigation 
because the contractor will determine whether to file based on the merits of a protest.  
Efficiency 
 
Covers a Small Portion of Actions, but a Large Portion of Dollars (Advantage) 
This proposal removes automatic stays for large contracts defined as follows: $10M for 
development or $50M for production or services, inclusive of contract options. Since the 
Government uses a few large contracts to cover a substantial portion of work, this proposal will 
affect a small portion of procurement actions, but a large portion of procurement dollars.  
  
                                                          
92 Steven Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure of Businesslike Government. (working 
paper no. 022, The George Washington University Law School, 2001), 40-42. 
93 Gordon, Daniel. "Bid Protests: The Costs Are Real, But the Benefits Outweigh Them." Public Contract 
Law Journal 42, no. 3 (2013), 33. 
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In FY2013, the Top 100 Contractors (excluding FedEX) accounted for 4.6% of procurement 
actions and 55.6% of procurement dollars.  
Procurement Actions versus Procurement Dollars (FY2013) 
Category Number of Procurement Actions 
(%) 
Procurement Dollars (%) 
Top 100 Contractors 
(Excluding FedEX) 
615,083 (4.6%) $254.7B (55.6%) 
FedEX 6,870,949 (50.8%) $0.9B (0.2%) 
Remaining Contractors 6,032,297 (44.6%) $202.1B (44.2%) 
   
Total 13,518,329 (100%) $457.7B (100%) 
94 
The closer you get to the top, the higher the concentration of procurement dollars. In the same 
year (FY2013), the Top 10 Contractors accounted for 1.0% of procurement actions and 28.7% of 
procurement dollars. 
Procurement Actions versus Procurement Dollars (FY2013) 
Category Number of Procurement Actions 
(%) 
Procurement Dollars (%) 
Top 10 Contractors 140.560 (1.0%) $131.3B (28.7%) 
Remaining Contractors 13,377,769 (99%) $326.4 (71.3%) 
   
Total 13,518,329 (100%) $457.7B (100%) 
 
                                                          
94 Chart derived from "Federal Procurement Data System - Next Generation." Federal Procurement 
Report. Accessed October 27, 2014. Available: 
https://www.fpds.gov/fpdsng_cms/index.php/en/reports.html 
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Among the top 10 contractors and their top 10 contracts, all 100 contracts exceeded the $50M 
threshold and are subject to this proposal. 
Top 10 Contractors and the Range of their Top 10 Contracts (FY2013) 
Contractor Dollar Range of Top 10 Contracts 
Lockheed Martin Corporation $564.1M to $3405.4M 
The Boeing Company $296.0M to $2042.0M 
Raytheon Company $200.5M to $315.6M 
General Dynamics Corporation $162.1M to $2375M 
SAIC Inc. $62.3M to $196.9M 
Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc. $102.8M to $1413.2M 
L3 Communications Holdings, Inc. $59.6M to $95.1M 
United Technologies, Inc. $133.9M to $804.4M 
BAE Systems, PLC $49.4M* to $169.5M 
Northrop Grumman Corporation $84M to $617M 
95 
*Including options, this contract is $61M instead of $49.4M.96 
  
                                                          
95 Ibid 
96 "BAE Systems Norfolk Wins $49.4 Mln USS Porter Deal." World Maritime News, May 1, 2013. 
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Limited Savings Per Protest (Disadvantage) 
Currently, a GAO protest will trigger an automatic stay until the resolution of the protest, 
which is up to 100 days. Even though the GAO can take longer than 100 days to resolve protests 
that “present novel or significant issues of interest to the procurement community,”97 this almost 
never occurs. In a recent case, GAO denied an exception to the 100-day rule stating that doing so 
would “undermine the bright-line nature of our timeliness rules…” and the GAO’s priority is to 
resolve “protests expeditiously without unduly disrupting or delaying the procurement process.”98 
Therefore, the standard time for a protest resolution at the GAO is 100 days. Since this proposal 
only eliminates the automatic stay at the GAO, it will only save about 100 days of disruption per 
contested contract. 
The savings are even further limited by the fact that the GAO can dismiss a protest if the 
protest “lacks “a detailed statement of the legal and factual grounds of protests” or which fails “to 
clearly state legally sufficient grounds of protest.””99 100 If GAO increases the use of this 
authority and makes a determination in a timely fashion, then eliminating the automatic stay for 
large contracts yields trivial savings. However, there is no evidence that GAO has used this 
authority commonly which leads to the supposition that GAO hesitates to invoke this authority 
except in the most egregious cases. 
                                                          
97 Kim, Eugene. "Late Is Late: The GAO Bid Protest Timeliness Rules, and How They Can Be a Model for 
Boards of Contract Appeals." Army Law 30 (2007), 30, 36. 
98 Ibid 37 
99 4 C.F.R. § 21.5(f) (2007) 
100 Robert Metzger, and Daniel Lyons, A Critical Reassessment of the GAO Bid-Protest Mechanism. 
(working paper., Georgetown University Law Center, 1977), 1268. 






Preserves Meaningful Relief (Advantage) 
In the Pre-CICA days, industry alleged that agencies would intentionally erode 
meaningful relief by commencing performance.102 In response, the current version of CICA 
protects relief by enacting an automatic stay on all contested procurements. CICA leaves room 
for the head of the procuring authority to override an automatic stay for “urgent and compelling 
circumstances” in “the best interest of the United States,”103 but this override is rare. If the agency 
overrides an automatic stay and the GAO sustains the protest for work that has “substantially 
been completed,” the GAO will recommend that the agency reimburse “the protestor its legal fees 
as well as its bid and proposal costs.”104 
This proposal assumes that an automatic stay on large contracts is unnecessary because a 
legitimate protestor will eventually find meaningful relief through voluntary agency action or 
successful arbitration. Due to the size of the contract, meaningful relief cannot be eroded during 
the 100 day protest period. However, this is not true for small contracts. Therefore this proposal 
                                                          
101 "Timeline of a Bid Protest." US Government Accountability Office. Accessed October 30, 2014. 
102 See note 37 
103 FAR Part 33.103 and 33.104 as well as 31 U.S.C. § 3553(c) and (d) 
104 Paul Benishek, and Benjamin Sheinman, Achieving Better Acquisition through ADR and other Best 
Practices for Resolving Bid Protests. (working paper., Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 11. 
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continues the automatic stay for small contracts to protect meaningful relief. In both large and 
small contracts, the GAO will retain the right to reward legal fees and bid and proposal costs in 
circumstances where work has “substantially been complete.” 
Untested Dollar Thresholds (Disadvantage) 
 This proposal assumes that the thresholds of $10M for development or $50M for 
production and services is a good dividing line between small and large contracts. As previously 
stated, this proposal believes that meaningful relief can be preserved at any value exceeding these 
thresholds. In reality, these dollar thresholds are untested and based on the Department of 
Defense’s threshold for acquisition plans (i.e. requiring senior leadership review). This proposal 
assumed that the Department of Defense went through extensive deliberation to formulate these 
dollar thresholds. However, these cutoffs may prove to be arbitrary over time and the 
Government has to be willing to re-visit them. 
Judicial Branch Remains Unaffected and Hostile towards Frivolity (Advantage) 
 This proposal will not change the litigation route through the judicial branch. The most 
recent significant change to the courts occurred in the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act 
(ADRA) of 1996 which contained a murky 2001 sunset of district court protest jurisdiction, but 
reaffirmed the COFC’s protest jurisdiction.105 There is much debate over the existence of 
concurrent jurisdiction between district courts and the COFC and this proposal will not affect the 
controversy one way or another. Despite the controversy, the COFC, in the least, will remain a 
full litigation option for the unsuccessful offeror.  
The judicial branch remains a hostile environment towards frivolous protests due to: 1. 
Fewer Incentives – An injunction is much more difficult than an automatic stay;106 2. Additional 
Disincentives – A court trial is costlier than GAO arbitration due to expanded discovery and de 
                                                          
105 Peter Verchinski, Are District Courts Still a Viable Forum for Bid Protests. (working paper, The George 
Washington University School of Law, 2003), 393. 
106 See note 89 
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novo107 and the COFC sanctions frivolity;108 and 3. Deference to the GAO – Schooner states, 
“Both the District Courts and the COFC typically remain cognizant and respectful of the 
Comptroller General’s more developed and broader-based precedent in protest matters.”109 
Another example of the courts’ deference to the GAO is in the Federal Court’s adoption of the 
CICA definition for “interested party.”110  
Administrative Capacity 
 
Reduction to Government Personnel (Advantage) 
 The reduction in frivolous protests will free up the GAO’s arbitration staff and the 
agency’s contracting staff to pursue more productive endeavors. The GAO’s freed resources will 
be due to fewer cases. The agency’s freed resources will be due to fewer personnel managing 
stopgap measures such as extending legacy contracts111 or issuing bridge contracts (i.e. contracts 
that fill a gap in services), and fewer personnel defending protests.  
VII. Political Analysis 
 
Obama Administration 
  This proposal will be a complicated sale to the Obama administration. On March 4, 2009, 
shortly after taking office, Obama released a memorandum outlining his contracting objectives: 1. 
Reduce sole source and other limited-competition contracts; 2. Reduce Cost-Reimbursement and 
other high-risk contract types; 3. Increase the capacity and ability of the acquisition workforce; 4. 
                                                          
107 See note 48 
108 Paul Benishek, and Benjamin Sheinman, Achieving Better Acquisition through ADR and other Best 
Practices for Resolving Bid Protests. (working paper., Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 68. 
109 Steven Schooner, Watching the Sunset: Anticipating GAO’s Study of Concurrent Bid Protest Jurisdiction 
in the COFC and the District Courts. (working paper no. 146, The George Washington University Law 
School, 2000), 6. 
110 Frederick Claybrook, Jr. Standing, Prejudice, and Prejudging in Bid Protest Cases. (working paper., 
Crowell & Moring, LLP., 2004), 536. 
111 Robert Metzger, and Daniel Lyons, A Critical Reassessment of the GAO Bid-Protest Mechanism. 
(working paper., Georgetown University Law Center, 1977), 1237. 
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Curtail public-private competitions conducted under OMB Circular A-76.112 This proposal can be 
viewed as antithetical to Obama’s first objective. The administration may view this proposal as 
limiting competition by removing an incentive to participate in the competitive process. 
 However, in the same memorandum, Obama stated that his over-arching objective is for 
Government contracting to perform “efficiently and effectively” resulting in the “best value for 
the taxpayer.”113 If achieving the “best value for the taxpayer” is the underlying goal, Obama’s 
contracting objectives only address improvements to the Government-side of the acquisition 
process, namely selecting better contract types and improving the acquisition workforce. This 
proposal will broaden his strategy to include improvements to contractor practices, namely 
ensuring that contractors only submit protests that provide meaningful oversight to Government 
contracting. 
 Obama will need to get comfortable with the idea that the Government can target 
frivolous protests without discouraging legitimate protests. This could be difficult for an 
administration that appointed Dan Gordon as its initial OFPP administrator. As stated previously, 
Gordon believes that the disruption caused by protests is overstated and policies aimed at 
reducing protests (even frivolous protests) are not worth the risk of reduced oversight. 
 However, if Obama is looking for bipartisan legislation to build good-will with 
Republican leaders in Congress, efficient contracting is a good place to start. Obama can continue 
the bipartisan roadmap set forth by Clinton which resulted in legislation that significantly 
overhauled Government Contracting (e.g. FASA of 1994, Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996). FASA 
and progeny were championed by the NPR efforts of Vice-President Gore and OFPP 
                                                          
112 Obama, Barack. "Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies." Subject: 
Government Contracting. March 4, 2009. Accessed November 14, 2014. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Memorandum-for-the-Heads-of-Executive-Departments-
and-Agencies-Subject-Government. 
113 Ibid 1 
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Administrator Kelman.114 This proposal will also require leadership from the White House and 
OFPP. 
Legislation: Following the Bipartisan Footsteps of FASA 
 
 The opportunity for bipartisan legislation exists because the Clinton roadmap is 
incomplete. While FASA and progeny overhauled government contracting, FASA “left the 
essential architecture of the protest mechanism undisturbed.”115 The Section 800 committee, a 
committee chartered by Congress to promote efficient contracting,116 would eventually 
recommend reforms to the judicial and executive protest mechanisms. Under recommendations 
from the Section 800 committee, Congress consolidated the courts under ADRA of 1996 and 
eliminated the Executive Branch’s GSBCA forum.117 The only forum that did not see substantial 
changes was the GAO forum.  
 In fact, the GAO forum remains largely unchanged from CICA’s original passage in 
1984. An outdated CICA is not only problematic for the GAO forum itself, but also the courts, 
which often use CICA standards for judgment (e.g. CICA’s “interested parties” definition.)118 It 
does not make sense that the Government would implement new procurement rules under FASA 
without revisiting the arbitration of these rules under CICA.  
In addition, the Section 800 committee recommended sanctions to frivolous protests. 
These sanctions were introduced in the failed Federal Acquisition Improvement Act of 1995.119 
Despite the bill’s failure, Senator John Glenn did not want sanctions to be forgotten and noted for 
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(working paper., George Mason University School of Law, 1996), 464. 
116 Section 800 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 800, 
104 Stat. 1485, 1587 (1990). 
117 Jonathan Cantor, Bid Protests and Procurement Reform: The Case for Leaving Well Enough Alone. 
(working paper., The George Washington University School of Law, 1998), 170-171. 
118 Frederick Claybrook, Jr. Standing, Prejudice, and Prejudging in Bid Protest Cases. (working paper., 
Crowell & Moring, LLP., 2004), 537. See Federal Circuit Court Decision in American Federation of 
Government Employees v. United States 
119 See note 63 
 35  
 
the record that sanctions “tackle the controversial, highly charged issue of reform of the protest 
system by attempting to streamline it and reduce the number of protests filed.”120  
This proposal will both update the GAO forum and target frivolous protests, without the 
use of sanctions. Instead, this proposal will remove an incentive to protest (i.e. the automatic 
stay). As stipulated by the COFC’s process for sanctions (Rule 11), a sanction requires time for 
due process to “avoid punishing a company for filing a good-faith but unmeritorious protest.”121 
The GAO 100 day rule does not have time for due process. Therefore, removing an incentive is 
the most expeditious stick available. 
This proposal will follow its bipartisan predecessors by avoiding the third rail topic of 
“what” gets contracted and instead focuses on “how” to improve the contracting process. 
Historically, the latter is more palatable. The difference can be demonstrated by comparing 
George W. Bush’s OMB Circular A-76 revisions and Clinton’s FASA. The OMB Circular A-76 
revisions expanded public-private competitions that determined “what” work should be 
contracted. Under the A-76 revisions, civil servants and contractors competed against each other 
for half of the 850,000 positions identified by the FAIR Act as “non-inherently Governmental.”122 
Needless to say, this was a politically charged issue. Upon taking office, Obama repudiated these 
public-private competitions.123 On the other hand, FASA focused on “how” to improve the 
contracting process and experienced bipartisan support from President Clinton and the 
Republican Congress. This proposal is firmly in the category of “how” to improve the contracting 
process and should see support from both President Obama and his Republican Congress. 
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Affected Party – Industry  
 
 Among industry, large businesses will likely adapt to this proposal without objection. 
Large businesses dominate the market and consequently take turns as both the victim and 
perpetrator of baseless litigation. The market is becoming even more concentrated as large 
businesses increase their share of the market while consolidating into a smaller pool of 
companies. In a 2014 article, the Washington Post purported that within defense contracting, “by 
2000, the top 10 companies controlled 60 percent of the market… Of the top 100 companies in 
1991, only 19 still exist today.”124 While a business strategy has always included impeding “the 
ability of rival offerors to do business with the government,”125 removing a tool of impedance 
will be a neutral change within this exclusive club. 
 Small businesses will view this proposal as another barrier to wresting contracts away 
from large businesses. With a murky district court jurisdiction (i.e. ADRA’s ambiguous sunset) 
and the elimination of the GSBCA, avenues for low-cost litigation are limited for small 
businesses.126 The GAO is one of few remaining “independent forum(s)… without the expense 
and formalities of judicial review.”127 As such, the GAO should not entertain any real barriers to 
protest legitimately. Small businesses often feel that sanctions serve as a barrier to all protests.128 
A way to ameliorate the objections of small businesses will be to convince them that this proposal 
is not a sanction, but the removal of an incentive to frivolously protest. Also, this proposal only 
removes the automatic stay on contracts large enough where meaningful relief will not be 
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compromised. However, this explanation may not be sufficient to allay the concern of critics who 
claim that the GAO forum must uphold the “statutory award criteria that were implemented to 
ensure that all competitors can compete equally.”129 
Affected Party – Agencies 
 
Agencies will accept this proposal because it discourages frivolous protests without 
requiring action on the agencies’ part. Agencies maintain a defensive posture towards protests, 
but are reticent when it comes to official action. Kelman describes the agency sentiment towards 
protests as “external monitoring by private attorneys general”130 which are time-consuming and 
expensive, expose agencies to huge vendor lawyer bills, compromise civil servant’s careers, 
cause public servants to fear deposition by high-priced lawyers, render agencies excessively risk-
averse, and decrease goodwill and partnership.131 
When defending against protests, agencies typically employ a passive strategy. Agencies 
do not exchange volleys with a vendor in overt conflict. It can be surmised that agencies avoid 
official action to avoid the corresponding scrutiny. A study conducted by Benishek and Sheinmen 
confirmed that agencies would rather “insulate their procurement decisions from outside reviews 
than avoid protests.” The former being a more passive strategy. Even when a protest occurs, 
agencies prefer not to directly attack the bidder. For example, an agency will often allow an 
automatic stay to run the entire 100 day course even though case law has shown that an agency 
can override an automatic stay with relative impunity.132 “However agencies are also reluctant to 
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end protests by rewarding protesters with direct contract awards. This provides a disincentive to 
protesters seeking an easy contract through litigation.”133  
 This proposal fits into the agency strategy of combating protests while avoiding litigious 
scrutiny. Since this proposal uses CICA to drive the reduction in protests, agencies will now 
experience the benefits of fewer protests without exposing their civil servants to the risks that 
come with decision-making. 
VIII. Recommendation 
 
The undersigned recommends amending CICA’s automatic stay provision codified in 31 
U.S.C. § 3553(d) to remove the automatic stay for large contracts (i.e. exceeding $10M for 
development or $50M for production and services). This proposal is one step towards efficiency 
while preserving meaningful oversight. The removal of the automatic stay on large contracts 
removes the incentive to protest without merit. The protection of the automatic stay for small 
contracts prevents an agency from eroding meaningful relief by commencing performance. 
The GAO forum is supposed to be efficient and the COFC is supposed to provide the full 
judicial experience. This proposal returns some efficiency to the GAO forum. The GAO process 
should not encumber governance without good reason. There is no good reason to automatically 
halt performance on every GAO protest.  
This proposal shifts some responsibility back to the contractor in determining whether to 
proceed with a protest based on its merits. Although this proposal has limited savings and the 
dollar thresholds may need adjustment, it is the first serious step in restructuring the GAO forum. 
CICA formalized the GAO forum in 1984 and since that time, procurement law has undergone 
significant changes, the largest being FASA in 1994. The need to update the GAO forum is 
overdue. If President Obama is looking for bipartisan legislation, he can continue the legacy of 
FASA through a corresponding update to CICA.  
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